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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF RELIGION-REQUIRING
REPORTS OF RELIGIOUS COUNSELING SESSIONS UNDER CHILD ABUSE
REPORTING STATUTES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
State v. Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 788 P.2d 1066 (1990).
David Motherwell, E. Scott Hartley, and Louis Mensonides were
religious counselors employed by Community Chapel, an evangelical
Christian church in Seattle, Washington.1 Their primary role was to
help individual members develop and enhance their relationship with
Jesus Christ through spiritual counseling.' Counseling topics varied ac-
cording to need and included marriage, family, and other personal
relationships.'
During counseling sessions, each of the three counselors learned of
child abuse incidents.' The counselors attempted to help the families
resolve the problems instead of reporting the alleged abuse to the ap-
propriate authorities.'
The State of Washington charged the three counselors with violat-
ing Washington's child abuse reporting statute.' The statute required
individuals in particular professions to notify state authorities within
forty-eight hours of receipt of information giving "reasonable cause to
believe that a child or adult dependent person has suffered abuse or
neglect." 7 Although the reporting statute did not mention religious
counselors specifically, the court found them to be mandatory reporters
1. State v. Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 356, 788 P.2d 1066, 1067 (1990).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Hartley and Motherwell were each told by different women that their husbands had
sexually abused their daughters. Another woman told Mensonides that her husband had beaten
their two small sons. Id.
5. Id. at 356, 370, 788 P.2d at 1067, 1075. One method each counselor used was temporary
removal of family members from the home. Id. at 370, 788 P.2d at 1075.
6. Id. at 356, 788 P.2d at 1068.
7. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (1) (Supp. 1990) provides:
When any practitioner, professional school personnel, registered or licensed nurse, social
worker, psychologist, pharmacist, licensed or certified child care providers or their em-
ployees, employei of the department, or juvenile probation officer has reasonable cause
to believe that a child or adult dependent person has suffered abuse or neglect, he shall
report such incident, or cause a report to be made, to the proper law enforcement
agency or to the department as provided in RCW 26.44.040. The report shall be made
at the first opportunity, but in no case longer than forty-eight hours after there is rea-
sonable cause to believe that the child or adult has suffered abuse or neglect.
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under the statute's definition of "social worker." 8
In separate trials, each counselor was convicted of a misdemeanor
for failure to report child abuse.9 The respective courts gave each coun-
selor a deferred sentence with one year of probation and ordered each
to complete an educational course on sexual abuse.1"
On consolidated appeal,1" the Supreme Court of Washington af-
firmed the convictions of Motherwell and Mensonides, but reversed
Hartley's conviction." The court held that Hartley, an ordained minis-
ter, was exempt from reporting under an implied exemption for
clergy." The court concluded that Motherwell and Mensonides were
not entitled to the clergy privilege because neither was licensed or or-
dained when he first learned of the suspected child abuse.1 '
Motherwell and Mensonides contended that the reporting statute
violated their first amendment rights to free exercise of religion. 15 The
Washington Supreme Court held that the defendants had not estab-
lished infringement of these rights. 16 The court further held that re-
quiring the counselors to report did not violate the establishment clause
of the first amendment. 17
8. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020 (8) (1986 & Supp. 1990). Social worker is
defined as:
anyone engaged in a professional capacity during the regular course of employment in
encouraging or promoting the health, welfare, support or education of children, or pro-
viding social services to adults or families, whether in an individual capacity, or as an
employee or agent of any public or private organization or institution (amended 1987,
substituting "social service counselor" for "social worker" and inserting "including
mental health, drug, and alcohol treatment, and domestic violence programs" after
phrase "or providing social services to adults or families").
9. 114 Wash. 2d at 356, 788 P.2d at 1068.
10. Id. at 356-57, 788 P.2d at 1068.
11. Id. at 357, 788 P.2d at 1068. Motherwell, Hartley, and Mensonides appealed to the
Washington Court of Appeals, which consolidated the cases. The court of appeals certified the
case to the Supreme Court of Washington, and it was accepted for review. Id.
12. Id. at 359, 788 P.2d at 1069.
13. Id. at 358-59, 788 P.2d at 1069. In 1975 the Washington legislature deleted clergy
members from the list of required reporters. Therefore, the court reasoned that the legislature
intended to exempt clergymembers from mandatory reporting when they were counseling their
parishioners in a religious context. Id.
14. Id. at 360, 788 P.2d at 1069. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020 (11) (Supp. 1990)
defines "clergy" as "any regularly licensed or ordained minister, priest, or rabbi .... (emphasis
added).
15. 114 Wash. 2d at 360-62, 788 P.2d at 1069-71. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1: "Congress
shall make no law ...prohibiting the free exercise . of religion.
16. Id. at 364, 788 P.2d at 1072.
17. Id. at 368, 788 P.2d at 1074. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion . .. ."
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The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the report-
ing statute was void for vagueness."8 Finally, Motherwell and Menso-
nides alleged that the reporting statute was overbroad and, therefore,
violated the first amendment.' 9 The court held that the statute was not
sufficiently overbroad since it did not "reach a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected activity." 2 State v. Motherwell, 114 Wash.
2d 353, 788 P.2d 1066 (1990).
Like other privileges, the religious privilege stems from a balanc-
ing of interests." The privilege exists because an exemption of confi-
dential communications with clergy is deemed more important to soci-
ety than the introduction of all relevant evidence in court.22 Society
acknowledges the need of individuals to confide in a clergyman without
fear of exposure.23 If the clergy privilege is not allowed, people may
refrain from seeking counseling with ministers.24
The common law refused to recognize a clergy-penitent privilege.25
However, in 1813 a New York court acknowledged the exemption in
People v. Phillips.26 The United States Supreme Court followed suit,
recognizing the value of the clergy privilege in 1875.21
In the early 1800s the New York legislature passed the first stat-
ute providing a clergy-penitent privilege.2" Other states followed, and
by 1987 forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Is-
lands all provided the exemption.2 9 Although state statutes vary, most
18. 114 Wash. 2d at 370, 788 P.2d at 1075.
19. Id. at 371, 788 P.2d at 1075.
20. Id. at 372, 788 P.2d at 1076.
21. Comment, The Clergy-Penitent Privilege and the Child Abuse Reporting Statute: Is
the Secret Sacred?, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1031, 1038 (1986).
22. Id.
23. Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV.
163, 173 (1981).
24. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 95, 109 (1983).
25. Note, Texas' Clergyman-Penitent Privilege and the Duty to Report Suspected Child
Abuse, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 231, 232 (1986).
26. People v. Phillips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813) (a Roman Catholic priest learned of child
abuse during administration of the sacrament of penance, but refused to testify)(unreported case
in I W.L.J. 109 (1843)), cited in Note, When Must a Priest Report Under a Child Abuse Report-
ing Statute? - Resolution to the Priests' Conflicting Duties, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 431, 437 & n.43,
438 & n.45 (1987). See also Comment, supra note 21, at 1032 n.7.
27. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). The court stated "suits cannot be main-
tained which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional ...." Id. at 107.
28. N.Y. REV. STAT. § 72, pt. 3, ch. VII, tit. III, art. 8 (1828), cited in Note, supra note 26,
at 438 n.54.
29. Note, supra note 26, at 438-39.
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statutes contain similar prerequisites to application of the privilege."0
To be privileged, there must be a religious communication," with a
clergyman 32 when he is functioning in his official capacity. 3   There
must also be an intention of confidentiality. 4 Finally, confidentiality
must be required by the particular religious discipline. 5
States differ as to who qualifies as a clergyman. 6 An early Iowa
case held that Presbyterian church elders were "ministers of the gos-
pel" and entitled to protection under the privilege.3 7 The New Jersey
Superior Court decided that a nun did not qualify as a clergyman,38
while a Missouri court concluded that a nun's position as spiritual advi-
sor was sufficient to invoke the privilege.39
To be privileged, the communication must be made to a clergyman
while he is acting in his professional capacity.' The South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that marriage counseling by a clergyman was
within his professional capacity."1 Similarly, in In re Verplank 2 the
court decided that a chaplain performing draft counseling services was
acting in his official capacity. 3 Counselors assisting the chaplain were
also privileged because they were performing the same activities."
Other courts have denied the clergy privilege to a rabbi assisting de-
fense preparations,'45 a nun functioning as a hospital administrator, 6
30. Note, supra note 26, at 439.
31. Smith, The Pastor on the Witness Stand: Toward a Religious Privilege in the Courts,
29 CATH. LAW. 1, 10-11 (1984).
32. Id. at 7.
33. Note, supra note 26, at 440.
34. Smith, supra note 31, at 6.
35. Note, supra note 26, at 442.
36. Note, supra note 26, at 439.
37. Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1917) (elders were entitled to
clergy privilege because they were appointed for life and authorized to conduct services in the
pastor's absence).
38. In re Murtha, 115 N.J. Super. 380, 279 A.2d 889, cert. denied, 59 N.J. 239, 281 A.2d
278 (1971). The court relied heavily upon the fact that Sister Margaret did not perform any of
the normal priestly functions. Id.
39. Eckmann v. Board of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70, 72 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
40. Yellin, supra note 24, at 121-24.
41. Rivers v. Rivers, 292 S.C. 21, 354 S.E.2d 784 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
42. 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
43. Id. The chaplain and other staff members counseled draft registrants concerning service
in the armed forces. The court concluded that this counseling was privileged because a draft
registrant's response to selective service regulations often involves spiritual and moral decisions.
Id. at 435-36.
44. Id. at 436.
45. People v. Drelich, 123 A.D.2d 441, 506 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1986).
46. Masquat v. Maguire, 638 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1981).
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and a church elder investigating rumors.' 7
The clergy privilege does not apply unless the communication is
made by someone seeking spiritual assistance."8 Generally, conversa-
tions with a friend who happens to be a clergyperson are not protected
under the privilege."9 Nonetheless, a North Carolina court allowed an
exemption for statements made to an aunt who was also a
clergymember. 50
To claim the clergy privilege, the communication must be made
with the intention of confidentiality. 51 Statements made during pastoral
visits are confidential. 2 However, statements made to a clergyman dur-
ing a business consultation5" or to a pastor in his wife's presence5' are
not confidential. Also, records of a Catholic welfare association are not
privileged unless they contain confidential communications with a
priest. 55
Finally, many states do not recognize a clergy privilege unless the
particular religious discipline requires confidentiality. 56 Thus, an in-
criminating letter to a pastor whose denomination did not practice con-
fession was held not privileged. 57 Other courts allow the privilege when
the communication is made as part of a church practice or proceeding,
even if confession is not required by the discipline. 58
47. Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881).
48. Note, supra note 26, at 441. See Lucy_ v. State, 443 So. 2d 1335 (Ala. Crim. App.
1983) (statements made while seeking a place to hide from police were not penitential in nature);
Cottrill v. State, 365 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (statements during marriage counsel-
ing exempt only if spiritual in nature); State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 954 (1976) (statements while attempting to pawn watch not penitential); United States
v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1981) (conversations related to business transactions not
spiritual).
49. Yellin, supra note 24, at 121. See also Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171, 231 S.E.2d 769
(1977) (statements were not made in "professing religious faith or seeking spiritual 'comfort' or
,guidance' 
").
50. State v. Jackson, 77 N.C. App. 832, 336 S.E.2d 437 (1985), review denied, 316 N.C.
199, 341 S.E.2d 572 (1986) (admission of defendant after praying with aunt/clergymember; court
could not determine to what extent personal or as clergymember).
51. Note, supra note 26, at 441.
52. Snyder v. Poplett, 98 I11. App. 3d 359, 424 N.E.2d 396 (1981).
53. People v. Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d 419, 184 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1982).
54. State v. West, 317 N.E. 219, 345 S.E.2d 186 (1986).
55. State v. Lender, 266 Minn. 561, 124 N.W.2d 355 (1963).
56. Note, supra note 26, at 442.
57. Sherman v. State, 170 Ark. 148, 279 S.W. 353 (1926).
58. Rivers v. Rivers, 292 S.C. 21, 354 S.E.2d 784 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (held marriage
counseling to be a church practice and privilege applied); Milburn v. Haworth, 47 Colo. 593, 108
P. 155 (1910) (held statements to minister and three church members not connected with church
proceedings, so not privileged).
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Although all five prerequisites have been met, the court may find
the privilege has been waived. 9 In Perry v. State60 the Supreme Court
of Arkansas. held that the defendant waived the clergy-penitent privi-
lege by disclosing the same information to others.61 Similarly, in
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court62 an
Arizona court held that the privilege had been waived by implication
when the defendant revealed the substance of the conversation to the
police.6 3
In recent years, courts and legislatures have broadened the scope
of the clergy-penitent privilege in an effort to prevent discrimination
against certain religious groups." The privilege has also been extended
to cover draft, marital, and other secular counseling by clergy. 5 This
trend reveals legislative recognition of the importance of protecting
confidentiality of religious communications. 66
At the same time, society has become increasingly aware of child
abuse.67 In reaction to this problem, state legislatures swiftly enacted
child abuse legislation.6 8 By 1965 all fifty states and Washington D.C.
had enacted a child abuse reporting statute. 9 Revised versions of these
statutes are currently in force. 70
59. Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent Privilege - The
Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 38 (1968).
60. 280 Ark. 36, 655 S.W.2d 380 (1983).
61. Id. at 37, 655 S.W.2d at 380-81.
62. 159 Ariz. 24, 764 P.2d 759 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
63. Id.
64. Comment, Religious Confidentiality and the Reporting of Child Abuse: A Statutory
and Constitutional Analysis, 21 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 23 (1987).
65. See People v. Pecora, 107 Il. App. 2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 865, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028
(1969) (holding communications during marital counseling with clergy are privileged); Rivers v.
Rivers, 292 S.C. 21, 354 S.E.2d 784 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding communications during mari-
tal counseling with clergy are privileged); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(holding communications with clergy during draft counseling are privileged).
66. Comment, supra note 64, at 24.
67. Comment, supra note 64, at 3-4. In an effort to protect abused children, some legisla-
tures have expanded the categories of mandatory child abuse reporters to include clergymen.
Comment, supra note 64, at 24. Child abuse is a serious problem in America. Although it is
impossible to determine the extent of such abuse, it is estimated that 76,000 to 4.1 million chil-
dren are abused annually. Note, supra note 25, at 237.
68. Myers, A Survey of Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Statutes, 10 J. Juv. LAW 1, 2
(1986).
69. Comment, Civil Liability for Failing to Report Child Abuse, 1 DET. C.L. REV. 135, 139
(1977).
70. ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (Supp. 1989); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-504 (Supp. 1989); CAL. PENAL CODE §
11166 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
[Vol. 13:151
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Although child abuse reporting statutes differ considerably from
state to state, they commonly include sections setting forth the purpose
of the statute, relevant terms, mandatory reporters, voluntary reporters,
circumstances requiring a report, time limits for reporting, immunities,
abrogation of privileges, and penalties for failure to report.7 All report-
ing statutes share the threefold purpose of identification of abused chil-
dren, investigation of reports of abuse, and treatment for abuse.7 2
Reporting statutes designate who must report child abuse. 3 While
the earliest statutes required only physicians to report,74 modern stat-
utes include other professions as well. 75 The majority of states classify
physicians, nurses, law enforcement officers, social workers, and teach-
ers as mandatory reporters.76
In addition, fifteen states now require reporting by any person, 77
38a (West Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (1983) D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1352 (1988
& Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.504 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5
(Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Supp. 1990);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-3
(Burns 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
1522 (Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 620.030 (Michie/Bobbs-MerrilI Supp. 1988); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011 (Supp.
1989); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-704 to 705 (Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch.
119, § 51A (West Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West Supp. 1990); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Supp. 1989); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 210.115 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §
28-711 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.220 (Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29
(Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-15 (1989);
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1989); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1990); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.750 (Supp. 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 2204 (Purdon Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-3 (Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
510 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-10 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1-403 (Supp. 1990); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.01 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-4-503 (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 683 (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.3
(1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (1986); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (West Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. § 14-3-205 (1986) [hereinafter Reporting
Statutes].
71. Reporting Statutes, supra note 70.
72. Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse at the Future: A
Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI[-] KENT L.
REV. 641, 651 (1978).
73. Reporting Statutes, supra note 70.
74. Fraser, supra note 72, at 656.
75. Fraser, supra note 72, at 657.
76. Fraser, supra note 72, at 657-58.
77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.504 (West 1986 & Supp.
1990); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-3 (Burns 1987); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-711 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
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and four additional states require reporting by any person who en-
counters an abused child during performance of his professional du-
ties.78 Although forty-nine states have a clergy-penitent statutory privi-
lege, some reporting statutes specifically designate clergymen as
mandatory reporters. 9
Every reporting statute sets forth the circumstances mandating a
report.80 Reports are not limited to known child abuse.81 Some states
require a greater degree of certainty of abuse than do others.82 While
some statutes require reporting when there is "reasonable cause to be-
lieve" there has been child abuse or neglect,8" other statutes mandate
reporting when there is any "reason to suspect" abuse or neglect.84
Although most statutes impose criminal sanctions for failure to re-
port suspected child abuse, some professionals may be disregarding this
mandate.8 5 Others may be reporting cases which do not involve genuine
abuse out of fear of criminal liability for failure to report.86 It is some-
times difficult to distinguish cases of actual abuse from legitimate
punishment.87
It is impossible to determine the impact of reporting statutes upon
child abuse. 8 The number of reports of suspected child abuse has sub-
stantially increased since the enactment of these statutes. 89 Yet the in-
9:6-8.10 (West Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-15 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. 7A-543 (1989);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21. § 846 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-3 (Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-403 (Supp. 1990); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.01 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 62A-4-503 (1989); WYO. STA. § 14-3-205 (1986).
78. ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2204 (Purdon
Supp. 1990).
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (West Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353
(Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (Supp. 1989).
80. Reporting Statutes, supra note 70.
81. Fraser, supra note 72, at 659.
82. Fraser, supra note 72, at 659.
83. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (Supp. 1990).
84. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (Supp. 1989).
85. Comment, supra note 64, at 7.
86. Comment, supra note 64, at 7-8.
87. Comment, Reporting Child Abuse: When Moral Obligations Fail, 15 PAc. L.J. 189,
192-93 (1983). The U.S. National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect published one report indi-
cating that more than sixty-five percent of reported cases of abuse are "unfounded." Unfounded
reports damage family relationships and divert valuable resources from use in protecting children
in immediate peril. Comment, supra note 64, at 4 n.23, 8.
88. Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 715
(1966).
89. Fraser, supra note 72, at 646.
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crease may not be directly attributable to this legislation.9 Despite the
broad range of professionals designated as mandatory reporters, non-
mandatory reporters make the vast majority of re.ports.91 Most child
abuse reports are made by nonprofessionals such as relatives, neigh-
bors, and coworkers.92
Despite dramatically increased reporting, child abuse still goes
largely undetected. 93 Child abuse is difficult to detect94 and prove.95 Al-
though more cases are being reported, the number of trained personnel
to investigate reports is not being proportionately increased.96 Conse-
quently, the time available for thorough investigation of each individual
report is constantly diminishing.97
Because of the inherent difficulties in proving child abuse, most
states abrogate some statutory privileges such as husband-wife, doctor-
patient, or clergyman-penitent. 9 The majority of states allow an attor-
ney-client privilege even when other privileges are denied. 99 Twenty-six
state statutes do not specifically abrogate the clergy-penitent privi-
lege. 00 However, the language in many of these statutes is unclear
about whether the privilege is recognized."'
90. Fraser, supra note 72, at 646.
91. Comment, supra note 21, at 1048-49.
92. Fraser, supra note 72, at 646.
93. Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse: The Need to Narrow the Grounds
for State Intervention, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 556 & n.62 (1985).
94. Fraser, supra note 72, at 670.
95. Burke, Evidentiary Problems of Proof in Child Abuse Cases: Why Family and Juve-
nile Courts Fail, 13 J. FAM. L. 819 (1974).
96. Fraser, supra note 72, at 646.
97. Fraser, supra note 72, at 646.
98. Fraser, supra note 72, at 664.
99. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Im-
plications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1227 (1962).
100. ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-504 (Supp. 1989); CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 11166 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104 (1986); D.C. CODE ANN. §
2-1352 (1988 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1
(Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-3 (Burns 1987);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (Supp.
1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 4011 (Supp. 1989); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-704 to 705 (Supp. 1989);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West
Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.220 (Supp. 1989); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §413 (McKinney
Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-10 (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503 (1989); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 683 (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.3 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1990); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (West Supp. 1989).
101. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-3 (Burns 1987) (stating "any individual" must report);
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Denial of the clergy privilege under child abuse reporting statutes
raises the issue of unconstitutional violation of the religion clauses of
the first amendment. 02 In Lemon v. Kurtzman'0 3 the United States
Supreme Court used a three-part test for determining establishment
clause violations.104 The Lemon test requires that the law be secular in
purpose, not primarily advance or inhibit religion, and not create exces-
sive entanglement of government and religion.1"5 Some states interpret
their reporting statutes as allowing a clergy exemption only if the de-
nomination requires confidentiality of confession.0 6 The question be-
comes whether such an interpretation primarily advances religions,
such as the Roman Catholic Church, which have this requirement. 01
Another question is whether requiring a minister to reveal confi-
dential communications burdens the free exercise of religion. 0 8 If a
burden is found, the sincerity of the belief and degree of interference
are examined to determine if the burden is constitutionally impermissi-
ble. 109 Once sincerity is established, the government must show a com-
pelling state interest." 0 Furthermore, if a less restrictive alternative is
available to protect the interest, it must be used."' A statute that bur-
dens the exercise of religion violates the free exercise clause, absent a
showing that the state has used the least obtrusive means available to
achieve a compelling state interest."
12
In State v. Motherwell"' the Washington Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Washington child abuse reporting stat-
ute violated religious counselors' first amendment right to the free exer-
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1990) (stating "any person or institution" must report).
102. Note, supra note 25, at 242. See U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .
103. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
104. Id. at 612-13.
105. Cox, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establishment Clause Anal-
ysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1984).
106. Note, supra note 25, at 244.
107. Note, supra note 25, at 243-44.
108. See Comment, supra note 64, at 36; Comment, supra note 21, at 1047; Smith, supra
note 31, at 15.
109. Comment, supra note 64, at 36-37.
110. Comment, "Bless Me Father, For I Am About To Sin. : Should Clergy Counsel-
ors Have a Duty to Protect Third Parties, 22 TULSA L.J. 139, 157 (1986).
111. Note, Seeing in a Mirror Dimly? Clergy Malpractice as a Cause of Action: Nally v.
Grace Community Church, 15 CAP. U.L. REV. 349, 367 (1986).
112. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
113. 114 Wash. 2d 353, 788 P.2d 1066 (1990).
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cise of religion.11' Justice Durham, writing for a unanimous court,
stated that in order to establish a violation, the defendants must show
that the state compelled them to violate a sincerely held religious
tenet."15 The counselors argued that their religious beliefs required
them to attempt to help parishioners through counseling and prayer
and to inform the authorities only when these methods proved
unsuccessful.""
The court reasoned that the government had not coerced the de-
fendants to violate a religious tenet since they could continue counsel-
ing after reporting." 7 The court did note that it might reach a different
conclusion if the religious discipline required confidentiality in counsel-
ing sessions." 8 However, the court held that there was no coercion to
violate a religious tenet because the defendants' beliefs did not require
confidentiality." 9 The court concluded that impairment of religious
practices due to child abuse reporting requirements did not establish
infringement of the first amendment right to the free exercise of
religion. 2'
The court further stated that even if the defendants had estab-
lished infringement, the government's compelling interest in protecting
children from abuse justified the alleged constitutional violation.' 2 ' The
court then concluded that the state had used the least restrictive means
available to achieve its purpose.' 22 Mandatory reporting, as opposed to
intervention to prevent abuse, was less intrusive.' The court rejected
the defendants' suggestion that all religious counselors be exempt from
reporting, maintaining that this exemption would "unduly interfere"
with the state's goal of protecting children from abuse.'24
114. Id. at 360-64, 788 P.2d at 1070-72. See U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress
shall make no law .. .prohibiting the free exercise . of religion.
115. 114 Wash. 2d at 361, 788 P.2d at 1070.
116. Id. at 362, 788 P.2d at 1070-71.
117. Id. at 362-63, 788 P.2d at 1071 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 603-04 (1983), where the Supreme Court held that denial of tax benefits to private schools
did not prevent the schools from observing their religious tenets; and Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), where the Supreme Court held that impaired
religious practices were not sufficient to establish a free exercise violation).
118. Id. at 363, 788 P.2d at 1071 n.8.
119. Id. at 362-63, 788 P.2d at 1071. The lower court found infringement of religious
rights, but justified because of the state's compelling interest. Id. at 360-61, 788 P.2d at 1070.
120. Id. at 363-64, 788 P.2d at 1071-72.
121. Id. at 364-66, 788 P.2d at 1072-73.





The counselors also argued that the reporting requirement violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment.'25 Using the threefold
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,26 the court found the reporting statute had
a secular purpose and did not primarily affect religion. 1' The court
rejected the defendants' contentions that the reporting statute resulted
in entanglement of government and religion when the court determined
that the counselors' acts constituted "social work."' 28 The court stated
that the definition of "social worker" in the reporting statute encom-
passed both secular and religious activities, making it unnecessary to
determine which category applied to the counseling services.'1 9
Motherwell and Mensonides alleged that the reporting statute was
unconstitutionally vague because ordinary individuals would not antici-
pate that "social worker" included religious counselors. 3 ' The court
found this argument unpersuasive since the reporting statute specifi-
cally defined the role of a social worker. 131 Moreover, a memorandum
from Motherwell to the other counselors stated unequivocally that they
were required to report information concerning child abuse under the
statute. 13
Additionally, the counselors argued that the reporting statute was
overbroad because it would be unconstitutional to apply it to ordained
ministers.' 3 Justice Durham declared that application of the statute to
ordained ministers would not be unconstitutional. 3 4 He stated that the
religious belief is determinative, rather than the status of the individ-
ual.' 35 However, the court yielded to the legislative application of sta-
tus to determine that only Hartley had not violated the reporting
statute. 13
Finally, the defendants argued that the reporting statute was un-
125. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. I which provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion ...."
126. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
127. 114 Wash. 2d at 367, 788 P.2d at 1073.
128. Id. at 367-68, 788 P.2d at 1073-74.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 369, 788 P.2d at 1074.
131. Id. at 369-70, 788 P.2d at 1074-75.
132. Id. at 370, 788 P.2d at 1075.
133. Id. at 371, 788 P.2d at 1075.
134. Id. A statute which prohibits constitutionally protected activities is overbroad and,
therefore, unconstitutional. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 844, 845 (1970).
135. 114 Wash. 2d at 371, 788 P.2d at 1075.
136. Id. at 360, 788 P.2d at 1069. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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constitutionally overbroad when applied to ministers whose religion re-
quired confidentiality of confession.137 The court reasoned that over-
breadth must be substantial to render a statute unconstitutional.'38 The
court concluded that the Washington statute did not affect "a substan-
tial amount of constitutionally protected activity" because religious
personnel made less than two percent of total child abuse reports in
1984.139
Motherwell reinforced the clergy-penitent privilege in child abuse
reporting.140 The court acknowledged that requiring reports by clergy
could cause perpetrators of abuse to refrain from seeking help." 1 The
court also extended the privilege to secular counseling by clergy outside
the scope of conventional religious activities."4 Yet, the court refused
to broaden the privilege to include associate counselors.143
This decision demonstrates strong judicial support for child abuse
legislation and a reluctance to find first amendment infringement under
state reporting requirements. Ironically, the court concluded that the
reporting statute was not overbroad because statistics indicated that
only two percent of child abuse reports were made by religious person-
nel.'4 These statistics would also support a conclusion that the govern-
ment does not have a compelling interest in requiring clergy to report
child abuse. 145
The court's determination that religious counselors could continue
counseling after revealing the contents of private conversations with a
parishioner to the authorities'4 " is troubling. When applying the clergy
exemption to Hartley, the court acknowledged that requiring clergy to
report child abuse could cause parishioners to refrain from confiding in
137. Id. at 371, 788 P.2d at 1075.
138. Id. (citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987)).
139. Id. at 372, 788 P.2d at 1076.
140. Id. at 359, 788 P.2d at 1069.
141. Id. The court stated "Announcing a rule that requires clergy to report under all cir-
cumstances could serve to dissuade parishioners from acknowledging in consultation with their
ministers the existence of abuse and seeking a solution to it." Id.
142. Id. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
143. Cf. In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (the California court allowed a
privilege for all counselors; the court found it significant that the activities of the unordained
counselors conformed to those of a Protestant minister). Id. at 436. See supra notes 42-44 and
accompanying text.
144. 114 Wash. 2d at 372, 788 P.2d at 1076.
145. See Comment, supra note 64, at 40-46.
146. 114 Wash. 2d at 362-63, 788 P.2d at 1071.
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ministers.1 7 It appears even more likely that a counselee would not
continue counseling sessions after learning that the counselor had re-
ported his disclosures to law enforcement agencies. Yet, the court held
that this impairment of counseling ability was insufficient to establish
first amendment infringement. 14 8
Although the court held that the state was using the least restric-
tive means to achieve its goal of protecting children from abuse, 14 9
there are other reporting options which the defendants did not raise
and the court did not address. Religious counselors could be required to
report only in cases of known abuse or neglect.' The state could limit
reports by religious personnel to observations. 51 This would allow min-
isters to maintain confidential communications without greatly impair-
ing the State's interest.152
By refusing to even consider the impairment of religious counsel-
ing as sufficient to establish a free exercise infringement, 53 the court
closed the door on many future constitutional challenges. The court left
one small crack by stating that a different conclusion might be in order
if a religious denomination specifically required confidentiality. 15  How-
ever, the court did not address the issue of whether an exclusion for
some denominations, and not others, would violate the establishment
clause.' 55 This dictum may encourage other religious sects to adopt pol-
icy statements affirming confidentiality as a central tenet,156 which
could increase future conflicts between the child abuse reporting stat-
utes and the first amendment.
Mona J. McNutt
147. Id. at 359, 788 P.2d at 1069.
148. Id. at 364, 788 P.2d at 1072.
149. Id. at 366, 788 P.2d at 1073.
150. Under the Washington statute reports are required if there is "reasonable cause to
believe a child . . . has suffered abuse or neglect." See supra note 7 and accompanying text. See
also Comment, supra note 64, at 47-48.
151. See Note, supra note 26, at 464.
152. See Note, supra note 26, at 464.
153. 114 Wash. 2d at 362-64, 788 P.2d at 1071-72.
154. Id. at 363 n.8, 788 P.2d at 1071 n.8.
155. See Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent Privilege -
The Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 41-47 (1968) for a discussion of
this issue.
156. See Comment, supra note 64, at 14-19 for an excellent discussion of confidentiality
within denominations. It appears that many denominations have already adopted confidentiality as
a central tenet. Id.
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